We study the e↵ects of peer-group sizes on tweeting in a large-scale and influential social media platform.
Introduction
Internet-enabled social media platforms permeate our social and economic lives. These platforms largely depend on the contributions of individual users. The user-generated content has unambiguously significant impacts on many aspects of business such as branding and advertising (Gopinath, Chintagunta, and Venkataraman 2013 , Kumar et al. 2013 , Sun and Zhu 2013 , consumer learning and response (Zhao et al. 2013, Gans, Goldfarb, and Lederman 2016) , product demand and sales (Zhu and Zhang 2010 , Ma, Krishnan, and Montgomery 2015 , Gong et al. 2016 , Kumar et al. 2016 , employee productivity (Wu 2013, Huang, Singh, and Ghose 2015) , and even the market value of firms (Nam and Kannan 2014, Schweidel and Moe 2014) .
1 Services provided by these social media platforms are widely adopted by users across age, gender, income, and ethnicity. As the largest social media platform, Facebook.com had attracted more than 1.65 billion registered users by April 2016. Twitter.com had surpassed 310 million active users per month by the first quarter of 2016. In China, 47% of its population, or more than 600 million people, use social media platforms.
2
Social media platforms are often equipped with social networking services (SNS). When generating or sharing content on these platforms, users are influenced by their "neighbors" (Zhang, Liu, and Chen 2015) . Particularly, the size of peer groups has a prominent impact on the content generating process (Zhang and Zhu 2011) . Di↵erent from the structure of bilateral friendship networks that are prevalent on platforms such as Facebook.com, in Twitter-type networks, a user's peer groups include followees (users she follows) and 1 The influence of social media goes beyond business. It has broad impact on nearly every aspect of our social lives and the society. For example, social media usage is shaping the workings of democracy globally (Chi and Yang 2011) . In particular, Twitter.com is believed to be the "heartbeat" of 2016 US Presidential election (Manjoo 2016) .
2 PewResearch Internet Project annual reports from online surveys can be found at http://www.pewinternet.org/ fact-sheets/social-networking-fact-sheet/. Annual survey by "We Are Social" reports the statistics of online social networks: http://wearesocial.net/blog/2015/01/digital-social-mobile-worldwide-2015/.
followers (users following her). On one hand, a user can read all her followees' tweets, and so the followees constitute her major source of information in the network; on the other hand, her tweets can be viewed by all her followers. Every user is keenly aware of this fact. Previous studies have examined the e↵ects of a user's followers (Toubia and Stephen 2013) or the e↵ects of overlap in online neighbors (Peng et al. 2016) ; we seek to fill the gap in the literature by separating the e↵ects of followees and those of followers on content generation and sharing.
Separating the followee e↵ects and the follower e↵ects may be key for us to understand the highly skewed distribution of user-generated content in such a social platform. In the large-scale network we observe, approximately 10% of the users contribute more than 50% of the total tweets in stock, while half of them provide less than 15% of the tweets.
Similarly, 50% of the users post fewer than six tweets monthly, while a user at the 90th percentile generates on average 40 tweets a month. For a platform seeking to promote its prosperity, and a commercial user seeking to manage its brand, and solicit feedback and sales from (potential) consumers, the lack of participation from the majority of the users on the platform presents a problem. In this paper, we endeavor to understand and remedy this problem by looking into the tweeting incentives of a noncommercial user, in particular, "for whom to tweet?"
We exploit the asymmetry of Twitter-type networks to disentangle a user's conflicting incentives of free-riding and social benefit considerations when providing tweets as a public good. We view user-generated content as public good provision on the Internet (Duan, Gu, and Whinston 2008) . Undersupply is what typically characterizes public good provision due to free-riding incentives (Olson 1965) . In a "directed" network, the information embedded in tweets passes on mainly from a user to her followers, although the reverse direction of information transmission is also possible. 3 A user may free ride on others' (including followee and follower) contribution. With an increase in one's peer group, a user may think a relevant piece of information is already disseminated among the shared base of followers so there is less need for her to exert e↵ort (to provide the public good). That is, the freeriding incentive postulates the negative e↵ects of both the followee count and the follower count. 4 Social benefit considerations, however, may counteract the free-riding incentives.
Social benefits could be purely altruistic motives (Arrow 1972 , Chamberlin 1974 , seeking social influence (Becker 1974) , or motivated by the perception of others (Fehr and Falk 2002) . The common theme of these benefits is that they increase with a larger audience;
as a result, the size of both followees and followers may have positive e↵ects on one's tweeting. 5 Summing up, the overall e↵ects of the followee count or the follower count on one's tweeting are not a priori clear cut. A negative e↵ect of the followee/follower count indicates that the free riding incentives dominate the social benefit incentives; a positive e↵ect indicates otherwise.
We implement this idea using data from Tencent Weibo, Twitter's counterpart in China.
Tencent Weibo is the largest Twitter-type social media platform in China, with over 220 million registered users by 2014. The main challenge in identifying the e↵ects of asymmetric group size is the endogeneity of network formations (Manski 1993) . In our context, the unilateral relationships of following are established by users who deliberately choose to connect. Econometrically, there exist user unobserved characteristics correlated with network formations that in turn determine the network sizes, and these characteristics simultaneously determine her tweeting behavior.
We address the endogeneity problem by devising di↵erent identification strategies using two datasets from Tencent Weibo. The first one we obtain is a proprietary longitudinal dataset containing over 100, 000 observations of 20, 289 Weibo users over a four-month period between August 2011 and December 2011. To alleviate the endogeneity problem,
we consider a panel approach that incorporates user and time fixed e↵ects to control for unobserved user heterogeneity that is constant over time, as well as other unobservables that a↵ect all users but di↵er in time.
To further deal with the problem that there may exist time-varying unobservables, we obtain a second dataset, which is a random sample of the snapshot of the whole network with a much larger size and a more complete network structure. This administrative sample contains a cross section of roughly 1.4 million users up to a date in January 2012, with their activities and all followee and follower identities. We utilize the network structure to propose an instrumental variable (IV) method. Specifically, we use the average observed characteristics (including age and gender) of one's second-order followees and those of second-order followers as instruments for all endogenous variables. Under the assumption that a Weibo user does not tweet to win over her second-order neighbors (Murthy 2012, Lee, Hosanagar, and Tan 2015) , 6 the characteristics of the second-order neighbors a↵ect her first-order neighbors' tweeting activities, which in turn a↵ect her utilities of forming connections. Therefore, the IVs are correlated with the user's number of first-order neighbors, but independent of the characteristics governing her tweeting.
6 Murthy (2012) argues that the audience range of posts on Twitter-type social media is typically larger than the perceived range, although tweet posters often intend to circulate to their immediate followers instead of higher-order audience. Lee, Hosanagar, and Tan (2015) study an interesting application in the context of online product ratings and find that friends' ratings have significantly larger e↵ects than the ratings by the crowd.
We find that, from both the longitudinal and cross-sectional analysis, a larger number of followees leads to fewer tweets while a larger number of followers has the opposite e↵ects.
We further establish the relative magnitude of these two e↵ects. We find that the (positive)
follower e↵ect is much stronger than the (negative) followee e↵ect. That is, the positive e↵ect of followers may be (partly) o↵set by the negative e↵ect of followees. As such, user recommendations may lead to ambiguous results because of this trade o↵. To analyze this trade o↵, we perform simulations that randomly generate 1% new connections. As the (positive) follower e↵ect strongly dominates the (negative) followee e↵ect, we find that this 1% new connections will increase the total tweets by 25% on this particular platform.
Targeting less "active" users (in another set of simulations we randomly generate followers to targeted users-those with fewer followers) will increase the volume of tweets even more.
Similar to the findings for the volume of tweets, we also find asymmetric e↵ects on a user's binary decision whether to tweet at all during a certain period. From our longitudinal data, we find that a user is significantly less likely to engage in (any) tweeting with a larger group of followees, while the follower e↵ect is not significant. These findings complement the literature that in addition to the positive e↵ects of follower count, there exist negative impacts of a user's followees. Going beyond these average e↵ects, are the impacts di↵erent for users with di↵erent characteristics? To answer this question, we examine the moderating roles of user characteristics in the asymmetric e↵ects summarized earlier. Interestingly enough, we find that the follower e↵ect is more salient for users with more "active" followers, who generate more tweets on average, and that neighbors sizes (both follower and followee) have a greater impact on female users.
Our work uses the data that include the structure of the user's social networks to distinguish the asymmetric influences of followees and followers in directed networks. We add to the strand of the literature studying network e↵ects in social media (Aral and Walker 2011 , Bond et al. 2012 , Wu 2013 , Ma, Krishnan, and Montgomery 2015 , in particular, in directed networks. The closest to our study is Toubia and Stephen (2013) . They conducted a field experiment that added followers randomly to a treated group of Twitter users to study the e↵ects of follower count on a user's incentives to tweet. We take a step further by
showing that not only the number of followers but also followees a↵ect tweeting decisions significantly and that these e↵ects are opposite to each other in both signs and magnitude.
Our approach enriches our understanding of a directional network, suggesting that we need to consider the integrated whole of a network instead of only its "parts." In another work, Peng et al. (2016) study how the common followees and common followers (between tweet senders and receivers) a↵ect users' content sharing behavior-retweeting. In contrast, we complement this line of research by systematically investigating how the two peer groups (asymmetrically) influence both content sharing and generation in social media.
We also contribute to the broader literature on the provision of public goods in social networks (Olson 1965 , Andreoni 2007 , Bramoullé and Kranton 2007 , Chen et al. 2010 .
Di↵erent from traditional social networks, we study a virtual network where the networks of people may not have any real world connections. We show that these virtual networks have real impact on individuals' decisions to speak on line. Our results have managerial implications for both platforms promoting the activeness of their users and commercial users running marketing e↵orts on these platforms. We recommend strategies that can create a more leveled playground. Our findings of asymmetric e↵ects of followees and followers suggest marketers need to exert greater caution in attracting on-site followers and following noncommercial users.
Tencent Weibo
Tencent Weibo is the largest microblogging platform in China and provides Twitter-type social networking services. It was launched on April 1, 2010 as an a liated website to Tencent.com. 7 By January 2014, over 220 million users had registered on the platform, and the average number of daily active users had reached a record of 100 million.
Users of Tencent Weibo can either "tweet" or "retweet" other users' tweets. A tweet is a short note comprised of texts, links, or graphics that a user posts on her public profile page; while a retweet is a re-post or sharing of other users' tweets, also on her profile page.
We characterize tweets (and retweets) as public goods, since they are free to access within the community. The maximum length of a tweet (as well as a retweet) is 140 Chinese characters. In addition to tweeting, Weibo users communicate with each other by tagging others in a tweet, commenting below a tweet, 8 or sending messages privately.
In addition to providing the micro-blogging service summarized above, Weibo users form a directed network that is connected by the "following" relationship. A Weibo user can choose to follow another user's tweets without the other party's consent. In this relationship, we define the focal user the "follower" and the other party as the "followee." A connection can be established unilaterally (meaning that the followee does not have to follow the follower's tweets); therefore, the Weibo network is directed. Once a following relationship is established, all followees' tweets and retweets automatically show up on the follower's page. It is, however, asymmetric that the follower's tweets do not appear on the followee's pages. With this particular feature, the followers are also called a user's "audience" on Tencent Weibo. We provide comparisons with Twitter.com in Appendix A.
7 Tencent is the largest networking service provider in China. The services they provide include instant messaging, personal space, and micro-blogging. Tencent's flagship products are QQ and WeChat. By the end of 2013, there had been over 0.8 billion registered users on Tencent; they had reached a peak of 0.18 billion users online simultaneously. Their o cial website provides more information: http://www.tencent.com/en-us/index.shtml.
8 More specifically, a user can mention others, not necessarily her followees or followers, in certain tweets (or comments) by typing their user names following the "@" symbol directly in the texts. Any user can post comments below a tweet unless the setting is customized. The comments, together with the tweets, are listed publicly on Weibo pages. Any registered user can read the content. 10 Unfortunately, Tencent does not provide the identifies of these followees or followers so we cannot construct (at least part of) the network.
Data and Samples
11 We focus on the balanced panel mainly because the data provider failed to collect the missing records, but not because those records do not exist or are randomly missing. We conduct a robustness check using the original sample of 29, 985 users. Results are consistent with those from our main sample. second-order follower. As mentioned in the introduction, the instruments we propose are the average observed characteristics of second-order neighbors. This is the reason we focus on this subset of users. Table 2 and 3 summarize this cross-sectional sample. We notice that 50% of the users have less than 19 followees and 2 followers, while a user at the 90th percentile has 93 followees and 5 followers. We also observe a highly skewed distribution of tweets from the sample. Although we worry that the observations are quite noisy because the standard deviations are in the order of magnitude larger than either the mean or median, we think the large standard deviation is due to the highly skewed distribution of tweets, which is the nature of this type of social network. Part of the goal of this paper is to devise mechanisms to encourage more active participation of low percentile tweets and generate a more even distribution of tweet behavior. Later, we also carry out robustness checks by excluding "VIP" users with a huge number of followers or followees in our empirical analysis later.
Comparing Table 1 with Table 2 we notice that users in the panel data have fewer tweets (the median of the tweets distribution is 49 by the end of the sampling period) than those sampled in the cross-sectional data (with the median 143 by January 2012). In contrast, half of the users in the cross-sectional sample have more than 19 followees and 2 followers, while half of the users had at least 34 followees and 41 followers before January 2012, which is the sampling date of the cross-sectional data. As the cross-sectional data represent a random sample from the Weibo user pool, the panel data may have oversampled users with larger number of neighbors.
Empirical Strategies and Results
A major challenge of identification is that a user's network or peer group-followees and followers on Weibo-is endogenously formed (Manski 1993, Bramoullé, Djebbari, and Fortin a The total number of tweets is the sum of tweets and retweets.
b A "friend" is a user who is both an individual's followee and follower.
c Defines users with year of birth being before 1940 or after 2000 as "outliers." 2009). Specifically, a user has unobserved characteristics not captured by data, but these characteristics a↵ect their tweeting behavior, as well their decisions to form links (determining the number of followees) and other users' decisions to follow them (determining the number of followers). Based on the two datasets we have, we devise two methods to approach this endogeneity issue. Furthermore, we are able to cross check our findings using the results we obtain from these two samples.
Panel Data Approach and Results
Unobserved user characteristics (individual heterogeneity) that are constant over time are an important source of endogeneity in social networks. Personality, as an example, significantly influences tweeting behavior and simultaneously determines peer groups. Besides this, exogenous shocks that a↵ect all Weibo users, e.g., the introduction of a new private messaging tool available to all Weibo users, is another cause of correlations between neighborhood sizes and the error term. To account for these two endogeneity sources, we adopt a panel data method that incorporates both user and time fixed e↵ects. This pattern indicates that a propensity to tweet is left censored at zero. A user may have great disincentives to tweet, but all we observe is that she did not tweet during a period of time. To deal with this dichotomy that governs tweeting behavior, we consider two decisions facing each user: the decision whether to tweet; and if a user decides to tweet, how much she would tweet. Thus, we first study the e↵ects of the followee count and the follower count on the decisions to tweet or not. 14 Our main empirical specification is 15 14 With skewed distributions of the followee count and the follower count ( Table 1 shows that they are both skewed to the right.), we take log-transformations of these variables. Figure 5 in Appendix B displays the distributions of these variables up to September 15, 2011 after log-transformations.
where Y it is the user i's total number of tweets (including both tweets and retweets) between date t 1 and t; N e i,t 1 and N r i,t 1 are her number of followees and number of followers up to date t 1; X it includes the number of days between date t 1 and t; µ i are user fixed e↵ects, and ⌫ t the time fixed e↵ects; ✏ it is the idiosyncratic error term.
Given a user decides to tweet (for some t, Y it > 0), we further study the e↵ects of her neighborhood sizes on how much she would tweet in the network. Similarly, we take log-transformation of ( Y it + 1). Our main regression equation is
In both Equation (1) and (2), estimates of 1 and 2 will be the e↵ects of followee count and follower count respectively. The simultaneity between tweeting and network sizes causes concerns about serial correlations in error terms. As such, we report the standard errors clustering at the user level in all estimations.
Results
The main estimation results are reported in Table 4 and 5. Estimates of our main specifications, Equation (1) and (2), are presented in the fourth column of the corresponding table. 16 The results suggest that, in general, the number of followees in the previous period had negative e↵ects on both whether and how much to tweet, while the lag number of followers had (insignificant) positive e↵ects on both decisions.
More specifically, for the neighborhood size e↵ects on whether to tweet, the results indicate that a 1% increase in the number of followees from last period will lead a user from those who tweeted. For example, we find that the "silent" users had significantly smaller number of total tweets in stock, fewer followees, and fewer followers. Thus, we explore the two decisions facing each user, which corresponds with the hurdle model that is also standard in the literature on count data (Duan et al. 1983 ). In addition, given the large numbers of zeros observed in the data, nonlinear models such as a Poisson specification may not work well (Cameron and Trivedi 2005) . 2.5% less likely to tweet during the current period (Table 4) . In contrast, an increase in the lag number of followers increases the probability of tweeting (Table 4 ). The neighborhood size e↵ects on the quantity of tweets exhibit the same pattern. Specifically, a 1% increase in the number of followees reduces, on average, 0.08% of tweets up to the next observation date (Table 5) . However, a 1% increase in the number of followers tends to increase the number of tweets by 0.5 percentage point ( Table 5 ). Note that if we do not include user or time fixed e↵ects, both the number of followees and the number of followers are positively related to both decisions whether and how much to tweet (by comparing Spec 1 with Spec 4 in both Table 4 and 5). This illustrates the potential bias due to the endogeneity of an individual's networks or peer groups.
Cross-Sectional Data and Results
As briefly mentioned, some concerns on the endogeneity of group sizes, such as the correlation between the endogenous variables and user unobserved characteristics that are constant over time, are alleviated by including user and time fixed e↵ects. However, other types of correlations might still exist between the error term and endogenous variables.
As an illustration, the event of an individual's marriage during our study period might have long lasting e↵ects on both network formation decisions and tweeting behavior but it cannot be captured by either user or time fixed e↵ects. Thus we need more evidence from our cross-sectional data that allows us to address the endogeneity problem due to the user-time-specific heterogeneity and reverse causality.
Our cross-sectional data capture a user's network of followers and followers as well as the 
where Y i is user i's number of tweets; N terms that capture their unobservables. We assume that they are independent. Specifically, Assumption 1. The observed characteristics are orthogonal to unobserved characteristics, i.e., X ? ✏.
A major concern of causality arises because of the endogeneity of an individual's peer groups, which are followees and followers in our context. Under our current context, two issues are most relevant: the simultaneity problem and unobserved heterogeneity. For the first aspect, a user's tweeting behavior is not only a↵ected by the size of her neighborhood but also determines the number of other users who form connections with her. For the other, unobservables a↵ect her tweeting behavior, as well as network formation decisions.
Since a user's peer groups are endogenous, in Equation ( We propose to use a set of instrumental variables to approach the endogeneity issue.
Specifically, the IVs are the average observed characteristics, including age and gender, of a user's second-order followees and second-order followers who do not belong to her immediate neighbors.
We obtain the ideas for our IV strategy from the network formation process. Suppose user i is determining whether to follow another user j. Many factors may influence her connection decisions. First, since her followees' tweets are her major source of information on Tencent Weibo, user i cares about what and how much j tweets. She may also examine whether j has similar (both observed and unobserved) characteristics. In social networks, a user tends to follow others who are similar (the phenomenon of homophily, such as
McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook (2001)). On top of these, idiosyncratic shocks may also a↵ect user i's utility of following j. For example, the occurrence of a natural disaster makes a user more likely to follow news reporters or charity organizations. We thus formalize i's utility of following j as: for any j 6 = i,
where f (·) is a function of the quantity of tweets and all characteristics for both i and j;
and ⌘ ij is the idiosyncratic error term representing shocks that are i-j pair specific.
Given i's utility of following j, her decision to follow j obeys a simple rule that 8 > > < > > :
As a consequence, these network formation processes lead to variations in peer e↵ect variables in Equation (3), including N Based on the model in the last section, we discuss the validity of our instruments. Figure 1 is a parsimonious social network with only three users. Our discussions will be illustrated by this example. Specifically, suppose there are three Weibo users, i, j, and k, and two edges (following relations) connecting them. The arrows in Figure 1 show the following directions, e.g., user i is a follower of user j and thus j is i's followee.
Relevance: The first set of instruments contains all the average characteristics of secondorder followees. In Figure 1 , user k's characteristics will be used as instruments for the number of followees of user i. To see how they are relevant, they enter user j's tweeting equation (Equation (3) for j) since k is j's immediate followee. This implies that the instruments have direct e↵ects on j's actions, tweeting, which in turn determines i's utility of following j, since user j's tweeting enters Equation (4) Exclusion restriction: Clearly, the validity of our IV strategy requires a certain degree of shortsightedness when a user is tweeting. Specifically, we require the assumption that individuals are not perfectly forward-looking, in the sense that when tweeting they are only a↵ected by the characteristics of immediate followees and followers but not of neighbors'
neighbors (implicitly assumed in Equation (3)). Sociology literature (Murthy 2012) argues that Twitter users "are not always consciously aware that their tweets have the potential to travel further (than immediate followers)." As a result, the average observed characteristics of second-order neighbors do not enter a user's tweeting equation-Equation (3).
In addition, we also assume shortsightedness when a user is making network formation decisions. As implicitly assumed in Equation (4), the characteristics of neighbors' neighbors are excluded from the utility function. By using similar arguments as above, the information about the indirect connections does not a↵ect connection decisions.
Exogeneity:
It is left to show that our instruments are exogenous, i.e., the average observed characteristics of second-order neighbors is uncorrelated with the error term ✏ i in Equation (3). It turns out that Assumption 1 is a necessary condition for exogeneity.
To motivate this assumption, consider ✏ being the individual idiosyncratic component influencing her network formation utilities. It captures all remaining e↵ects that cannot be explained by an individual's observed characteristics, X. It is often assumed in the literature (Xiao 2010 ) that the observed and unobserved components capture separate e↵ects on outcomes, and thus are orthogonal to each other. We report our main results in Table 6 . In this table, Spec 1 to 3 report the OLS estimates of Equation (3) with the followees only, the followers only, and both followees and followers.
We report the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimates with IVs in the last column. Results of all first-stage regressions are reported in Table 14 in Appendix D. 19 We can see that using IVs changes the sign for the followee e↵ect and magnifies the follower e↵ect. Results in the last column are consistent with our findings from the panel data analysis, that is, we have negative e↵ect of the number of followees and positive e↵ect of the follower count. However, the magnitudes are di↵erent. Particularly, our estimates suggest that a 18 We define users with year of birth being before 1940 or after 2000 as age outliers. We include this dummy variable to control for cases of "fake" year of birth, a variable that is reported by users.
19 One may worry that excluding the average characteristics of immediate neighbors in our IV may lead to the issue of weak instruments. First, however, the results from the first-stage regressions (F -statistics in particular) suggest that we may not have such problems. More importantly, from the early discussions on the validity of instruments, our IVs are not likely to be weakly correlated with the endogenous variables. in columns 2 to 4. We also report the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimates in the last column using the average characteristics of second-order followees and followers as instruments for the endogenous variables. In all regressions, the dependent variable is log (# Total Tweets + 1) since there exist observations with no tweets at all. A GMM method considering heteroscedasticity yields similar estimates and statistical inferences.
b Comparing estimates in Spec 3 with those from 2SLS estimation, we find that ignoring the endogeneity overestimates the followee size e↵ect, while underestimating the e↵ect of followers.
1% increase in the number of followees will reduce a user's quantity of total tweets by about 0.2%. On the other hand, a 1% increase in the follower count raises the number of total tweets by more than 1.3%. Both e↵ects are statistically significant.
Interestingly, our results suggest that ignoring the endogeneity of a user's peer groups (Spec 3 in Table 6 ) will overestimate the e↵ect of followee count, while underestimating the e↵ect of the number of followers. We attribute these bias corrections to the correlations between the endogenous group sizes and the error term. For example, a person's "chattiness" is an important factor leading to more tweeting but omitted from X's (therefore picked up by the error term). A more chatty user wants more information from her followees, which leads to a positive correlation between the error term and the endogenous followee count. On the other hand, a chatty user may be more cautious about expressing herself with a large audience, which implies a negative relationship between the follower count and the error term.
Our results also show some interesting patterns in demographic groups. Younger Weibo users tweet more on average, as the estimate in Table 6 suggests a negative relationship between the total number of tweets and age. More interesting, a user with a group of younger friends also tweets more controlling for all other characteristics. We also observe that female users tend to tweet more than their male fellows. The estimate in Table 6 suggests that female users tweet about 24.5% more than male users.
Robustness Checks
To ensure the robustness of our empirical results, we address several concerns about our empirical specifications and the samples we use in this section. We find our main results are robust to changes in the formulation of an individual's tweeting, the exclusion of "inactive" users, and alternative specifications.
4.3.1. Panel Data: Unbalanced panel: As mentioned in the data section, the original sample of our panel data consists of 29, 956 users. For some of them, observations are missing at some dates. This missingness is due to the data provider failing to collect those records. Some may suspect that these "incomplete" users may carry extra information that is not captured by our main sample, potentially attenuating our results. We conduct our and 2 in the panel I of Table 7 . The results are qualitatively identical to our main results.
Tweets/retweets only: In the main specification and all robustness checks, the dependent variables are based on a user's number of total tweets that is the sum of tweets and retweets. As the behavior of writing tweets may be quite di↵erent from that of retweeting others' tweets, we conduct our second robustness check by constructing the dependent variables based on tweets only, or retweets only. We report the estimation results in Table   7 and again find qualitatively similar e↵ects as with our main results.
New neighbors: A third concern is about the empirical specifications used in our panel data analyses. One may argue that not only the number of followees and followers in the last period but also the number of new followees and new followers between date t 1 and t a↵ect a user's tweeting behavior. We thus add two additional controls to Equation 1 and 2 and estimate the following specifications:
where DV can be the tweeting indicator 1 ( y it > 0) and new tweet count log ( y it + 1); N e it and N r it are the change in the number of followees and followers respectively. Estimates are reported in Table 7 . Our main findings on the neighborhood size e↵ects are robust to this specification concern. It is also worth noting that the e↵ects of both the number of new followees and that of new followers on either the propensity or the intensity of tweeting are positive (Table 7 ).
4.3.2. Cross-Sectional Sample: Tweets/retweets only: We perform similar robustness checks for our analyses of the cross-sectional sample. Specifically, we also examine whether using tweets (or retweets) instead of the total number of tweets and retweets would alter our results, a situation which arises because of concerns about di↵erent behaviors underlying tweeting and retweeting. We thus calculate the dependent variables in Equation (3) based on the number of tweets (or retweets) and report the 2SLS estimates in the first two columns of Table 8 . The e↵ects of the followee count and follower count are shown to be not significantly di↵erent from those in our main results. In particular, we observe even stronger e↵ects of both the followee and follower counts on the quantity of retweets.
Inactive users: Another robustness check for the cross-sectional analyses is to examine the e↵ects of "no tweeting." We find that, in the cross-sectional sample, 992 (out of 402 , 470) users did not have any tweet as of the data collection date. We check whether the behavior of "active" users is significantly di↵erent by excluding these inactive users. We report the 2SLS estimates in the third column of Table 8 . The peer group size e↵ects are qualitatively similar to those from our main sample.
"Outliers": The sample of users in our cross-sectional analyses may be another concern.
Users with large numbers of followers are usually "VIPs" or celebrities in the o✏ine world. b In this robustness check, we delete the "inactive" users who had no tweets by the data collection date.
c We eliminate "outliers" with more than 1, 000 followers in this robustness check.
Their incentive to use the online networking tool may be quite di↵erent from an "average"
person. For instance, a politician in a campaign may tweet to attract more followers and then potentially more supporters in o✏ine elections. We examine whether our main results are mainly driven by these "outliers" by performing another robustness check. We check whether the main results still hold if these users are excluded. Specifically, we eliminate the users with more than 1, 000 followers, 20 the set of which contains 830 users. Results are reported in column (4) of Table 8 . Both the e↵ect of followees and that of followers are slightly smaller in absolute values, which implies that the tweeting of these VIP users is more "elastic" with respect to neighborhood sizes.
Discussions and Implications

Negative E↵ects of the Followee Count
Although our results from longitudinal and cross-sectional analysis di↵er in magnitude, the qualitative results are the same: the number of followers has positive e↵ects on a user's decision to tweet, while the e↵ects of the followee count are negative. Previous studies have focused almost exclusively on an individual's followers (Zhang and Zhu 2011, Toubia and Stephen 2013) and unanimously find positive impacts. One of our contributions is to divide the peer influence into two parts: in-network (followees) and out-network (followers). We consider theoretical explanations of the negative followee e↵ect from several aspects below.
First, as we have already argued, a social media user has conflicting incentives to contribute: free riding versus maximizing social benefits. The negative impact of the followee count shows that the user has the incentive to free ride the contributions of others, in particular followees. Second, and closely related to the first point, social media users are simultaneously information consumer and producer. When the acquisition of information is not free, social communication aggravates an individual's incentives to consume the information generated by others (free riding), than to aggregate and produce information themselves (Han and Yang 2013) . Last but not least, online attention is a scarce resource that online platforms compete for (Iyer and Katona 2016) . A user distributes his or her attention on an online platform between consuming (reading tweets by followees) and producing (tweeting). With a larger set of followees generating more tweets, the tradeo↵ between consumption and production apparently favors the former.
Comparing Panel with Cross-Sectional Analysis
Comparing results from the panel data analysis and those from the cross-sectional data, we find that the directions of group size e↵ects are the same while the magnitudes di↵er.
The inconsistency in magnitudes is partly driven by the relatively small sample size of our panel data. In our panel sample, we have records of 20, 289 users, which is fairly small compared with the Weibo population of over 500 million registered users. In contrast,
we have over 2 million users in our cross-sectional data. The sample comprises of a nonignorable subsample of the Weibo population. More important, as we argue in Section 4.1.2, extra correlations exist between the endogenous variables and the error term even after we incorporate both user and time fixed e↵ects. Because of these extra concerns, our results indicate that the panel data analysis overestimates the e↵ect of the followee count while underestimating that of the follower count. This is consistent with our discussions of bias corrections in cross-sectional analysis (Section 4.2.3) and supported by the data.
21
In addition, the empirical specifications in panel data analysis and cross-sectional analysis are di↵erent. In particular, the network structure in cross-sectional analysis allows us to incorporate the peer e↵ects terms (Ȳ (i) andX i in Equation 4.2), which are absent in the panel analysis since we do not observe the identities of an individual's neighbors. The literature (Manski 1993, Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens 2013) establishes important e↵ects of peer activities and characteristics on behavior, which should not be omitted. For these reasons, the results of the cross-sectional analysis are more trustworthy. Our counterfactual exercises later will be based on these results.
21 These findings provide further evidence that the error term is positively correlated with the number of followees while negatively correlated with the follower count. As an example, suppose the level of a user's dependence on the platform (varying across users and over time) enters the error term. This factor predicts a positive relationship between the number of followees and the error term, since more dependent users normally require more information from the platform. In contrast, such users are generally more cautious about their platform images and therefore more cautious about tweeting with a larger population of followers.
The Moderating Role of User Characteristics
Are the average e↵ects we have identified so far the same across di↵erent groups of users?
We examine two prominent user characteristics that can potentially moderate the main e↵ects, namely the "activeness" of a user's followers and gender.
We propose to use the average number of tweets plus retweets as a measure of an individual's followers' activeness on site. We di↵erentiate the sampled users by this measure and notice that one third of the sample provides fewer than 146 total tweets, one third more than 357, and the rest in between. We carry out subsample analysis, and the results are reported in Table 9 . Interestingly, we notice that the e↵ect of the follower count increases with follower activeness. In other words, as followers are more active in disseminating the content (instead of merely clicking on the notification of tweets received), it o↵ers more incentives for the content generator (the focal user) and thus she tweets more.
As one of the important contextual factors, gender has been shown to play a moderating role in Internet users' online activities (Ghose and Han 2011) . We examine whether there are any di↵erential e↵ects across gender groups. We separate our main sample into groups of female users and male users and report the results in Table 9 . We find that the size of peer groups has a larger influence on female users, regardless of the peer groups. More specifically, both the negative followee e↵ect and the positive follower e↵ect are larger in absolute values for female users.
Managerial Implications
From a practical point of view, especially the platform's purpose, Tencent Weibo wants to increase user "activeness"-tweeting more. A significant fraction of the platform's profits come from the click-through rate of the advertisements (Xiang 2012) . Higher level of user participation leads to more click-throughs of the advertisement. Our results have implications for platform managers hoping to promote more active contributions. In the first set, we categorize the sampled users by the activeness of followers, measured by the average total tweets among all followers. The results are reported in the first three columns. In the second set of subsample analysis, we di↵erentiate the users by their gender. Results are reported in the last two columns.
Platforms with a similar network structure can potentially benefit from strategies to promote more connections among users, but the asymmetric e↵ects of the follower count and the followee count act as a double-edged sword. To assess the impact of new connections on tweeting, we first study the marginal e↵ects of the follower count on a user's tweets. Based on our estimates, with the majority of users having one follower (180, 225 out of 402, 470 in the cross-sectional sample), hypothetically adding one additional follower will more than double their quantity of tweets (130.6% increase) holding everything else constant. Similarly, a user with 2 followers (the median of follower count distribution) will tweet 65.3% more with 1 additional follower. We visualize the estimated marginal e↵ects of the followee count and the follower count in Appendix E.
Although the positive e↵ect of the follower count on a user's tweeting is both economically and statistically significant, the e↵ect of additional links on overall tweeting in the network is still ambiguous. With one extra link in the network, a user has one more follower while the other has an additional followee. The negative e↵ect of the followee count on one's contributions masks the e↵ect on overall contributions in the network. To determine the overall e↵ect, we conduct a series of simulations.
Simulated E↵ects of Random New Links
We use the total contributions, more specifically the total number of tweets by all users, as a measure of "activeness." We also use other statistics about the distribution of tweets, such as mean and median, for similar comparisons. In our counterfactual exercises, we first randomly generate new links to the existing network. For each draw of a simulated network, we are able to trace out the e↵ect of changes in neighborhood sizes (followee and follower counts) on the total tweets for each user. To see this, we denoteỸ i the number of total tweets the user i would tweet in the simulated network. Suppose the number of followees and followers are N 
By comparing Equation (3) with (6), we show that the change in tweets,Ỹ i Y i , is
Then based on the 2SLS estimatesˆ 1 andˆ 2 , we can calculate the estimated change in total tweets for each user i. This allows us to back out the empirical distribution of Y i Y i , and examine whether random new connections between users lead to higher levels of contributions in the network.
We draw three di↵erent simulated networks, with 0.5 million, 1 million, and 2.5 million new links respectively. Given the number of new links, di↵erent draws of simulated networks yield almost overlapping distributions of the change in tweets. Therefore in Figure 2 we depict, for each given number of extra links, the empirical density function ofỸ i Y i from just one simulated network (no need to show overlapping distributions from di↵erent draws). We first notice that with more simulated links the distribution has fatter tails.
Unlike what the figures might suggest, the distributions are in fact highly skewed to the right. For example, with 2.5 million new links, the median is 129.82 while the mean is 343.62. Table 10 summarizes the quantiles and the total changes in tweets, a column corresponding to a random draw. We observe that with a greater number of simulated links, the total contribution measured by the total quantity of tweets increases significantly.
Particularly, with less than a 1% increase in the number of links (0.5 million), the total tweets increase by about 25.22%. More dramatically, the 2.5 million new links (about 5%
increase from the observed network) more than double the total number of tweets (increase by 133.75%). These dramatic e↵ects are mainly driven by users with a very small number of followers. We notice that, for all three simulations, more than 97% of the total change in tweets are attributed to the contributions by the subgroup of users with fewer than 5 followers. It is also clear, by comparing the quantiles, that the overall contributions are growing with more links.
Simulated E↵ects of Targeted New Links
Furthermore, the platform favors recommendations to the users with a small number of followers. For example, a more e↵ective way is to recommend users to follow those who have fewer followers (targeted recommendations) instead of popular ones who have established a large number of followers.
Since the marginal e↵ect of extra followers is larger and dominant at a small number of followers (relative to the e↵ect at a large number of followers), 22 this method will generate even more contributions than purely random recommendations. b The variable calculates the ratio of the sum of changes in Yi relative to the sum of Yi, i.e., the percentage change of total simulated tweets relative to the observed total tweets.
Given the follower e↵ects are dominant for occasional users, we then study whether targeting these users will promote a higher level of activeness in the social network. We From the practitioners' point of view, our results not only recommend strategies the platform can use to foster higher levels of contributions and thus to improve its long-term viability but also have implications for commercial users on social media. On this particular platform, Tencent Weibo, we find that the positive follower e↵ect is much stronger than the negative followee e↵ect, so such marketing e↵orts can be e↵ective. On another platform, however, similar marketing strategies may be unsuccessful. We hope that our results encourage the platforms to consider this tradeo↵, and take into account a social media user's conflicting incentives in generating and disseminating information in the network.
It is common practice that firms take advantage of the advertising slots embedded in social media timelines (Miller and Tucker 2013 ). Facebook's "Suggested Posts" and Twitter's sponsored tweets are two examples. One of the features, which is highly salient in these posts, is to attract more followers to the commercial pages. According to our results, these campaigns can have unintended consequences in that the e↵orts are not necessarily disseminated by word of mouth simply because users tweet less with an extra followee.
Conversely, our results suggest that firms can encourage noncommercial users' tweeting by following them. In addition, firms can benefit more by treating the users di↵erently based on their characteristics. Our findings suggest that following noncommercial users with more active followers is potentially more e↵ective than non-targeting strategies.
Concluding Remarks
Social media platforms largely depend on the content generated and shared by their users.
Understanding the users' incentives of contribution, more specifically for whom they tweet, lies at the heart of more active online engagement and thus the prosperity of social media platforms. While network e↵ects on Internet-based social media platforms are studied extensively in the literature, we take a step further by showing asymmetric influences of a user's di↵erent peer groups. We also complement this strand of literature by systematically studying the asymmetric peer-group size e↵ects on both content generating and sharing.
In this paper we study the asymmetric e↵ects of a user's followee count and follower count on her tweeting intensity on a large-scale social media platform. We propose two methods of approaching the issue of the endogenous network formation. The first is based on a panel method in which we incorporate both user and time fixed e↵ects. The second is a cross-sectional approach in which we use the average observed characteristics of second-order neighbors as instruments. We observe the similar asymmetric e↵ects from both methods. Specifically, a greater population of followers cause users to tweet more while the followee group size has negative e↵ects on tweeting. Further evidence suggests that although asymmetric, the follower e↵ect dominates the followee e↵ect.
Our findings speak to the question: for whom do the users tweet? The estimates indicate that they tweet for followers. Our findings, especially the positive e↵ect of the follower count, indicate that individuals receive benefits or utilities from contributing to online public goods-tweeting in our case. Therefore, our paper provides supporting evidence for the social e↵ects that explain the existence of many public goods with a large number of contributors in online communities. We make managerial recommendations for online platforms to promote more active contributions to online content. In many cases overreaching commercial users or VIPs may lead to reduction in the activeness of users on a platform (the negative "followee" e↵ect). For sustainable development, a social networking platform needs to find a way to get users with far fewer friends to participate. From our simulation results, an e↵ective way would be to promote more followers for these "small" users. In addition, these e↵ects may be moderated by user characteristics, which suggests that the platform should consider user heterogeneity when making decisions. Our results also have implications in terms of marketing strategies on social media platforms.
Our work can be extended in several ways. First of all, future research may enrich our findings by using data that include not only the structure of a user's social network but also the text of tweets and retweets. It would be useful to understand whether the magnitude and direction of our main findings are sensitive to the type of content being generated or shared. Second, beyond the context in this study, future research may apply similar identification strategies we propose to address the endogeneity issue in social networks. Given the existence of large amounts of observational data, future research can explore the structure of social networks and use instruments similar to ours. Finally, we focus on a complete network structure up to a certain point in time. It would enhance our understanding of network e↵ects if future research could explore how the change in network structure, e.g.
network position, a↵ects a user's contributions to online content. The dynamics of network structure and content generation may also shed light on how they influence each other. Twitter users can also make comments to a tweet by "replying" to it, these replies are private to the two involved parties-the user that posts the tweet and the replier. In sharp contrast, all comments on Tencent
Weibo are public (so are tweets) within the platform. Table 11 summarizes the similarities and disctinctions.
The Weibo network is identical to that on Twitter, but di↵erent from other social media platforms such as Facebook and LinkedIn, where friendships cannot be established without mutual consent and thus is undirected. 
Yes a Yes
Retweets -Re-post tweets by others. Yes Yes Tags -Notifying others of certain tweets (or comments) by typing their user names following the "@" symbol.
Yes Yes
Comments -"Commenting" on any tweet.
Public b Private
a If the texts are in Chinese, the restriction will be 140 characters instead of words.
b Twitter users can also comment on a tweet by "replying" to it. However, unlike the comments on Weibo, the replies on Twitter are private between the communicating parties. In this appendix, we present an investigation of our main sample in the cross-sectional analyses. Recall that we construct a sample of 402, 270 users from the original dataset consisting of 1, 392, 873 users. We compare these two samples and confirm the representativeness of our main sample. Table below shows summary statistics. We observe that our main sample is largely representative in terms of demographic characteristics, although these users have on average a larger number of followees and of followers and tweet more. This is mainly driven by our IV strategy that focuses on users with at least one second-order followee and one second-order follower. 
Appendix E: Estimated Marginal E↵ect of Peer Group Sizes
In this appendix we visualize the estimated marginal e↵ects of the followee count and the follower count based on our main specification (Equation (3)) and coe cient estimates shown in column 4 of Table 6 . Specifically, we first calculate the fitted value of the tweet count for each observation in the cross-sectional sample, based on our main specification. Then we calculate the hypothetical values of the predicted tweet count with one extra follower for all observations. The estimated marginal e↵ects are based on the di↵erences between the fitted values. It is straightforward to show that this estimated e↵ect is equivalent to
whereˆ 2 is the 2SLS estimate of 2 as in Equation 3. Note that the e↵ects of a user's characteristics cancel out in the ratio because of the log-log specification. Followees Count
Percentage
The top panel of Figure 7 displays the relationship between the number of followers and the estimated marginal e↵ects (in percentage) on the quantity of tweets with one additional follower. It clearly shows that the estimated e↵ects are positive and decreasing with the number of followers. The bottom panel of Figure 7 presents the relationship between the number of followees and the marginal percentage decrease in the tweet count from one additional followee. Note that the estimated e↵ects are negative for any sizes of followee population. Note also that the two panels in Figure 7 have fairly di↵erent scales with the follower e↵ects dominating almost everywhere.
Appendix F: Distributions of New Tweets by the Follower Count
To see that the follower e↵ect is larger at a lower level of the follower count, we dissect how the additional tweets, in the simulation with 1 million new links in Section 5.4.1, are attributed across users with di↵erent number of followers by controlling for the number of followees at di↵erent levels. More specifically, Table 15 reports the fractions of new tweets generated by users with di↵erent number of followers by fixing the number of followees. As an example, column (1) focuses on the subsample of users with fewer than 9 followees, which comprises 25% of the original sample (likewise 19 the median and 40 the 75% quantile). In this subsample, the users with fewer than 1 follower contribute more than 70% of the new tweets, while users in the top 25
percentile (with more than 3 followers) add only about 4% of the new tweets. Similar patterns show up in other subsamples (with di↵erent levels of followee counts). We repeat the same process for other simulations in Section 5.4.1 and similar results appear. The follower e↵ects are indeed larger for occasional users who have fewer followers, even controlling for the followee count. 
